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Do Investors Understand Really Dirty Surplus? 
 
ABSTRACT: This study addresses whether firms’ share prices correctly reflect two 
accounting measures, dirty surplus and really dirty surplus. Dirty surplus is readily 
observable from the financial statements, but really dirty surplus, which arises from 
recognizing equity transactions such as employee stock option exercises at other than fair 
market value, is not. Findings show that dirty surplus and really dirty surplus are irrelevant 
for forecasting abnormal comprehensive income. However, findings also indicate that 
investors appear to undervalue really dirty surplus. Hedge returns are insignificant when 
portfolios are formed based on dirty surplus, but are significantly positive based on really 
dirty surplus. Really dirty surplus positive hedge returns are robust to a variety of sensitivity 
tests. Taken together, the findings are consistent with either investors overvaluing firms that 
have large negative really dirty surplus or really dirty surplus being correlated with an 
unmodeled risk factor. 
 
Keywords: Dirty surplus accounting; Equity valuation; Hedge returns. 
Data Availability: Data are available from sources identified in the paper. 
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Do Investors Understand Really Dirty Surplus? 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A substantial and growing literature considers whether investors properly assess the 
characteristics of earnings and its components when setting stock prices. The question we 
address is whether firms’ share prices correctly reflect two accounting measures that have 
received relatively little attention to date. The first of these is commonly referred to as “dirty 
surplus,” which is a component of comprehensive income that is excluded from reported 
earnings, and therefore violates clean surplus accounting. We label the second accounting 
measure we consider “really dirty surplus,” which arises when a firm issues or reacquires its 
own shares in a transaction that does not record the shares at fair market value. Examples of 
this kind of transaction are shares issued in a stock option exercise and a conversion of a 
bond into common stock. Prior to the implementation of FASB Statement No. 141, the 
pooling of interest method of accounting for business combinations could also result in 
substantial really dirty surplus. If investors fully understand the predictive value of these 
accounting amounts, then it should not be possible to develop a profitable trading strategy 
based on the magnitudes of these items. 
Unlike dirty surplus, which is readily observable from the financial statements, really 
dirty surplus is unobservable. That is, even the most sophisticated investor cannot estimate 
readily the valuation impact of equity transactions that give rise to really dirty surplus 
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because equity transactions are recognized in the financial statements using an 
accounting-based rather than a market-based measure of the value of equity. The estimation 
task investors face is exacerbated by the fact that a firm can engage in numerous such 
transactions throughout the year. As a result, really dirty surplus transactions are less likely to 
be correctly priced than are dirty surplus transactions. 
Using financial statement and stock price data from 1976-2006, we first assess 
whether investors properly value each of these two components of earnings by estimating a 
residual income forecasting equation and an attendant valuation equation that includes both 
of these components. If current residual income is sufficient for forecasting next period’s 
residual income and current residual income and equity book value are sufficient for valuing 
current equity, then the forecasting and valuation coefficients on the income components of 
interest will be linked in a predictable manner. Finding a mismatch between the components’ 
forecasting and valuation equation coefficients would be consistent with investors mispricing 
of the components. 
We also conduct hedge portfolio returns tests. We adopt a buy-and-hold strategy to go 
long in firms with relatively large dirty or really dirty surplus and to short firms with 
relatively small dirty or really dirty surplus. We conjecture that small firms’ prices are less 
likely to reflect fully all publicly available information because investors incur 
proportionately greater transaction costs; as a result, they are less closely followed and less 
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likely to be subject to detailed accounting analysis. We therefore conduct both sets of tests 
separately for small, medium, and large firms to assess whether pricing effects are related to 
firm size. 
We find that both dirty surplus and really dirty surplus are irrelevant for forecasting 
abnormal very comprehensive income for all three firm size groups. Taking these results at 
face value, if investors correctly understand the implications of these persistence findings for 
valuation, then each kind of dirty surplus should be irrelevant for valuation for all firms. This 
prediction is borne out in the case of dirty surplus. However, the findings indicate that 
investors appear to undervalue really dirty surplus, which is consistent with investors being 
unable to assess the economic implications of really dirty surplus transactions. 
Buy-and-hold hedge return results support the findings from the tests linking the 
forecasting and valuation equations. As expected, hedge returns are insignificantly different 
from zero when based upon dirty surplus, regardless of firm size and investing horizon. In 
contrast, the hedge returns based on really dirty surplus are significantly positive for all three 
firm size groups. We also consider an alternative to our buy-and-hold procedure for 
computing hedge returns. Findings based on mean returns for monthly calendar-time hedge 
portfolios indicate that significantly positive hedge returns are concentrated within small 
firms. Findings from additional tests reveal that inferences relating to hedge returns are 
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insensitive to including controls for four previously identified mispricing anomalies, and to 
sampling procedures designed to attempt to focus on sources of really dirty surplus. 
Taken together, the findings are consistent with investors overvaluing firms which 
have large negative really dirty surplus. However, several cautionary notes are in order.  
First, although the hedge returns findings are consistent with mispricing of really dirty 
surplus, the possibility remains that the mismatch of the really dirty surplus forecasting and 
valuation coefficients is the result of model misspecification rather than mispricing. Second, 
as is likely the case with investors, we are unable to trace the sources of really dirty surplus to 
particular types of equity transactions. As a result, we cannot determine the extent to which 
potential mispricing arises from each type of transaction, i.e., our findings can only be 
interpreted as reflecting the aggregate effect of the various types of transactions. However, 
even if we could trace the sources of really dirty surplus, any resulting hedge returns might 
still be attributable to an unmodeled risk factor. 
Our study adds to prior research finding evidence of investors’ apparent failure to link 
the forecasting attributes of accounting amounts with the pricing implications (e.g., Bernard 
and Thomas 1989; Sloan 1996; Barth et al. 1999; Bradshaw and Sloan 2002; Burgstahler et 
al. 2002; Brown and Sivakumar 2003; Doyle et al. 2003; and Landsman et al. 2007). Our 
findings support prior studies that find that investors understand the forecasting properties 
and valuation implications of dirty surplus (Dhaliwal et al. 1999; O’Hanlon and Pope 1999; 
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Biddle and Choi 2006; Chambers et al. 2007). Although Landsman et al. (2006) examine 
valuation implications of expected future equity transactions arising from the exercise of 
employee stock options, their study does not address whether investors take full account of 
the valuation implications of past option exercises. Core et al. (2002) report findings 
suggesting that dilutive transactions, including those arising from employee stock option 
grants, are poorly dealt with in reported diluted earnings per share, leaving open the 
possibility that investors may have difficulty in valuing such transactions. 
Section II provides the motivation for the study and explains how dirty surplus and 
really dirty surplus are defined. Section III presents the research design, including 
computation of dirty surplus and really dirty surplus, development of the forecasting and 
valuation equations, and description of our hedge return strategy. Section IV describes the 
sample and data, and Section V presents the findings. Section VI summarizes and concludes. 
II. MOTIVATION 
The empirical issue that is central to this research is whether firms’ share prices 
correctly reflect two accounting measures that have received relatively little attention to date. 
The first of these is commonly referred to as dirty surplus, DS, which is a component of 
comprehensive income that is excluded from reported earnings, and therefore violates clean 
surplus accounting (Ohlson 1995; Feltham and Ohlson 1995). Dirty surplus accounting 
results in the basic residual income valuation model yielding an inaccurate estimate of equity 
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value because the sum of current book value and future net incomes does not equal the sum 
of future net dividends. 
The second accounting measure we consider we label really dirty surplus, RDS, 
which arises when a firm issues or reacquires its own shares in a transaction that does not 
record the shares at fair market value. The primary sources of RDS include employee stock 
option exercises, conversion of preferred stock and bonds, and mergers accounted for as 
pooling of interests. Whereas equity issued under employee stock option exercises or 
convertible instruments can give rise to unrecorded expenses, equity issued under pooling of 
interests gives rise to an unrecorded asset.1 
RDS violates the super clean surplus concept (Feltham 1996; Christensen and 
Feltham 2003), under which it is assumed that net dividends or share issuances are recorded 
at fair market value. When this condition is violated, the discounted present value of future 
net dividends (or equivalently, the sum of equity book value and discounted present value of 
future abnormal earnings) will not equal the market value of equity relating to current shares 
outstanding, but rather will equal the market value of equity relating to current shares 
outstanding plus the market value of other equity claimants. Because the equity transactions 
                                                      
1
 Equity issued under the pooling-of-interests method is not recognized at fair market value. In contrast, if 
purchase accounting were applied instead of the pooling-of-interest method, RDS would not arise; instead, the 
amount of RDS attributed to pooling of interests would be recognized in the financial statements as goodwill. 
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that give rise to RDS generally are recorded in the financial statements at less than market 
value, RDS is generally negative.2 
DS is readily observable from the financial statements. When one takes a clean 
surplus accounting perspective, as comprehensive income does, dirty surplus becomes a 
component of earnings. Dirty surplus is conventionally defined as the sum of recognized 
revenue or expense items that bypass the income statement. Unlike DS, RDS is not reported 
in the financial statements. A super-clean surplus accounting perspective requires that both 
dirty surplus and really dirty surplus become components of earnings so that the discounted 
stream of future residual income and current equity book sums to the market value of equity 
of current shareholders. If investors fully understand the implications of DS and RDS for 
valuation, then it should not be possible to develop a profitable trading strategy based on the 
magnitudes of these items. 
To see these points more clearly, consider first the following version of clean-surplus: 
BVEt = BVEt −1 + Xt + DSt − Divt + Pt
A (Nt − Nt −1) ,    (1) 
where BVEt  is defined as ending equity book value, Xt  represents net income, DSt  is 
dirty surplus, tDiv
 
is dividends, Nt  is the number of shares outstanding at the end of 
period t, and PtA  is the price per share used to record the issuance or reacquisition of equity 
                                                      
2
 It is possible that RDS could be positive. For example, consider a bond with a book value of $175 and fair 
value of $125 that is converted in to equity whose fair value is $150. In this case, RDS would be a positive 
amount equal to $25. Likewise, unrecorded goodwill associated with a merger accounted for under pooling of 
interests could give rise to negative unrecorded goodwill, and hence positive RDS. 
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shares in the accounting system. Note that if DSt  is zero, then the accounting is said to 




be the market price per share at the date of issuance or reacquisition of 
equity shares. We define really dirty surplus, RDSt , by 
RDSt ≡ (Nt − Nt −1)(PtA − PtM ) .       (2) 
By combining (1) and (2), we arrive at: 
DSt + RDSt = BVEt − BVEt −1 − Xt + Divt − Pt
M (Nt − N t −1).     (3) 
DSt , BVEt , BVEt −1 , Xt , and Divt
 
are readily observable in the financial statements. The 
final term on the right hand side of (3), PtM (Nt − Nt −1)  is not reported in the financial 
statements and therefore needs to be estimated. 
Note that if both DSt  and RDSt  are zero in (3), then the accounting is said to 
satisfy super-clean surplus accounting. The next section allows for both nonzero DSt  and 
RDSt
 
and super-clean surplus accounting by setting VCNIt = Xt + DSt + RDSt , where 
VCNI  is “very comprehensive” net income. Our definition of RDS, and hence VCNI, 
attributes all of the violation of super-clean surplus accounting to the period during which the 
equity transaction is recorded at a price other than fair market value. Christensen and Feltham 
(2003) show that when super-clean surplus accounting holds in periods subsequent to time t, 
application of the residual income valuation model will yield an estimate of equity value that 
equals the market value of equity of existing shares. Whether super-clean surplus accounting 
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holds up to and including period t simply affects the opening balance of equity book value at 
time t. However, if PM  and PA  differ for transactions in periods subsequent to time t, then 
super-clean surplus accounting will be violated and hence the residual income model will not 
yield an estimate of equity value that equals the market value of existing shares.3 
As stated above, the empirical issue that is central to this research is whether firms’ 
price per share correctly reflects DS and RDS. If it does, then one should not be able to 
develop a trading strategy based on DS or RDS that generates future abnormal returns. There 
are several reasons why we expect that RDS is the better earnings component on which to 
base a trading strategy. First, as noted above, unlike DS, RDS is not reported in the financial 
statements. Second, RDS appears to be inherently complex. For example, for most earnings 
components, any “overstatement” or “understatement” reverses in future periods; this does 
not hold for RDS. Third, research on DS (Dhaliwal et al. 1999; O’Hanlon and Pope 1999; 
Biddle and Choi 2006; Chambers et al. 2007) is not especially encouraging about the 
possibility that it can be used to construct a profitable trading strategy. 
Nonetheless, there are at least two compelling reasons for conducting our tests for DS 
as well as RDS. First, our study is the first to examine whether investors properly price DS 
                                                      
3
 Landsman et al. (2006) show that, in the case of employee stock options (i.e., contingent equity), when only 
clean surplus holds, the estimate of equity value equals the sum of the market value of existing shares and 
employee stock options. The study’s model considers the case in which employee stock options are granted at 
time t or earlier. The residual income valuation model does not yield a estimate of the value of existing shares 
because the options are not yet exercised, and when they are exercised in the future, the new shares will be 
recognized at PA  rather than PM . 
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based on the forecasting and valuation equations in the Ohlson (1999) model as well as on 
hedge return tests. Second, because we do not necessarily expect to find evidence of 
mispricing relating to DS, finding this is the case mitigates concerns that finding evidence of 
mispricing relating to RDS is attributable to misspecification of our empirical procedures. 
III. RESEARCH DESIGN 
Computation of DS and RDS 
 Following Dhaliwal et al. (1999) and Chambers et al. (2007), we compute DS as the sum 
of (a) the change in the balance of unrealized gains or losses on marketable securities (change 
in Compustat # 238), (b) the change in the cumulative foreign exchange adjustment (change 
in Compustat # 230), and (c) 0.65 times the change in additional pension liability in excess of 
unrecognized prior service costs (change in Min [(Compustat # 297 − # 298), 0]).  
Based on (3), we compute RDS as the change in the book value of common equity 
(Compustat #60 + #227 − #242), less DS, less net income (Compustat # 172 − #19), plus 
dividends (Compustat # 21), less share price at middle of fiscal year times change in common 
shares outstanding (Compustat # 25, adjusted for stock dividends and splits).4 Note that 
because we (and investors) cannot readily compute using the individual underlying equity 
                                                      
4
 To the extent that our definition of DS does not include all dirty surplus items (e.g., the cumulative effects on 
equity of retrospective accounting changes), DS will be measured with error. Because RDS is net of DS, such 
items will appear as part of our measure of RDS. Also, our measure of RDS includes treasury stock transactions 
taking place at prices that differ from the market price at the middle of the fiscal year. 
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transactions, RDS likely measures the true underlying construct with error.5 Share prices are 
from the CRSP database. 
Forecasting and Valuation Equations 
         To examine how the dirty surplus and really dirty surplus components of income 
relate to equity value, we adopt the abnormal earnings and equity valuation equations from 





a +ω2DSit +ω3RDSit +ω4BVEit +εit+1 .            (4) 
MVEit = α0 +α1VCNIit
a +α2DSit +α3RDSit +α4BVEit + uit+1 .     (5) 
(4) is the abnormal earnings forecasting equation, where abnormal very comprehensive 
earnings, VCNIt
a
, is defined as very comprehensive earnings, VCNIt, less a normal return on 
beginning equity book value, 
 
BVEt−1 , i.e., VCNIt − rBVEt −1 . Very comprehensive income is 
net income, NIt , plus both dirty surplus and really dirty surplus. Following Ohlson (1999) 
and Barth et al. (1999), VCNIt  is partitioned into NIt , DSt , and RDSt . The linear 
information system represented by (4) and (5) implicitly assumes that current earnings 
amounts are predictive of all future earnings. To the extent that this assumption is violated, 
the algebraic links between forecasting coefficients in (4) and the valuation coefficients in (5) 
described below do not necessarily hold. Of particular significance to this study is whether 
current realizations of DS and RDS are predictive of future aVCNI  that includes future 
                                                      
5
 In particular, the use of mid-year prices in the construction of RDS is arbitrary. We test the sensitivity of our 
findings to measuring RDS at alternative dates using both end-of-year and average of beginning- and 




realizations of these variables. 
In (4), ω1 reflects the persistence of abnormal very comprehensive earnings.  Prior 
research (e.g., Dechow et al. 1999; Barth et al. 1999, 2005) leads us to predict that ω1 is 
positive.6 The coefficients on the DS and RDS earnings components, ω2 and ω3, reflect the 
incremental effects on the forecast of abnormal earnings of knowing these components. If all 
earnings components have the same ability to forecast atVCNI 1+ , ω2 and ω3 will both equal 
zero, and thus knowing each component of earnings does not aid in forecasting abnormal 
earnings. As a result, we test the null hypotheses that ω2 = 0 and ω3 = 0 against the alternative 
that ω2 ≠ 0 and ω3 ≠ 0. 
Following Ohlson (1999, 150), we define DS (RDS) as being “forecasting irrelevant” 
if the quadruple {NIt ,  RDSt , BVEt , BVEt −1}  ({NIt ,  DSt , BVEt , BVEt −1} ) contains the same 
information as the quintuple {NIt ,  DSt ,  RDSt , BVEt , BVEt −1}  for purposes of forecasting 
VCNI t +1
a
. Because DS and RDS are components of VCNI ta , the total coefficients on DSt and 





 is unchanged across the different definitions of clean surplus and is 
therefore invariant to the definition of clean surplus. Thus, if ω1 + ω2 = 0 (ω1 + ω3 = 0), DS 
(RDS) is irrelevant for forecasting abnormal earnings. Conversely, if ω1 + ω2 ≠ 0 (ω1 + ω3 ≠ 
0), then DS (RDS) is said to have abnormal earnings “forecasting relevance.” To examine 
whether dirty surplus and really dirty surplus components of comprehensive income are 
forecasting irrelevant, we test the null hypotheses that ω1 + ω2 = 0 and ω1 + ω3 = 0 against 
                                                      
6
 Ohlson (1995, 1999) permits the forecasting and valuation equations to include “other information.”  
Fairfield et al. (2003) shows that accruals and asset growth have incremental ability to predict future return on 
assets. Accordingly, viewing accruals and asset growth as “other information,” below we report findings from 




the alternatives that ω1 + ω2 ≠ 0 and ω1 + ω3 ≠ 0. Note that ω1 reflects the forecasting 
relevance of the VCNIt
a
 − DSt − RDSt = NIt − rBVEt−1  component of VCNIt
a
. 
Equation (5) is the valuation equation based on the information dynamics in (4). α2 
and α3, the valuation multiples on DS and RDS, can be interpreted in a symmetrical fashion. 
This follows from the fact that although DSt  is by definition included in BVEt ,
 
it follows 
from (1) and (3) that RDSt
 
that arises from dilutive transactions is normally included in 
tBVE  as well.
7
 Analogous to the interpretation of ω2 (ω3) in (4), a2 (α3) reflects the 
incremental effect on valuation from knowing DS (RDS). If all earnings components are 
equally persistent then they should have the same relation with equity value. If this is the case, 
then a2 and a3 will equal zero, and knowing each component of earnings will not aid in 
explaining equity value. Thus, we test the null hypothesis that a2 = 0 (a3 = 0) against the 
alternative that a2 ≠ 0 (a3 ≠ 0). We define DS (RDS) as being “valuation irrelevant” if the 
quadruple {NIt ,  RDSt , BVEt , BVEt−1}  ( {NIt ,  DSt , BVEt , BVEt−1} ) contains the same 
information as the quintuple {NIt ,  DSt ,  RDSt , BVEt , BVEt−1}  for purposes of valuation. 
                                                      
7
 This can be illustrated by the following simple bond conversion example. Consider a firm that has a 
convertible bond outstanding on its books at $100 that is converted into shares worth $150 at time t. Under 
current GAAP, the share issuance will be recorded at $100. If we assume for simplicity that Xt = DSt = 0 and 
that BVEt-1 = $1,000, it follows that BVEt = 1,000 + 100 = $1,100. If this transaction were to be accounted for on 
a super-clean surplus basis, the share issuance would be recorded at $150, with the resultant cost of conversion 
appearing as RDSt = − 50. We can deduce from (3) that under super-clean surplus accounting BVEt = 1,000 − 50 
+ 150 = $1,100 as well. Although the calculations are more complex in the case of employee stock options, the 
same conclusions apply. Note that in the case of mergers accounted for under pooling-of-interests, the inclusion 




Also analogous to (4), the total valuation coefficient on DS (RDS) equals a1 + a2 (a1 + a3). 
Thus, if α1 + α2 = 0  (α1 +α3 = 0 ), DS (RDS) is irrelevant for valuation.8 Conversely, if a1 
+ a2 ≠ 0 (a1 + a3 ≠ 0), then DS (RDS) is “valuation relevant.” Analogous to the interpretation 
of ω1 in (4), a1 reflects the value relevance of the VCNI ta − DSt − RDS t  = NIt − rBVEt −1 
component of atVCNI . 
Barth et al. (1999) derives a formula linking the coefficients in (4) and the two 
suppressed equations with the coefficients in (5). For our purposes, we are not interested in 
exact coefficient magnitudes based on imposing a full set of linear information dynamics.  
Instead, we are interested in the weaker prediction that the sign of a1 + a2 (a1 + a3) will be 
based on the sign of 21 ωω +  ( 31 ωω + ). 
If prices are determined rationally, then if DS or RDS is irrelevant for forecasting the 
next period amount, each should be valuation irrelevant as well if the linear dynamics in (4) 
and (5) hold. Also, the sign of a1 + a2 (a1 + a3) will be the same as the sign of ω1 +ω2  
(ω1 +ω3 ). If we find apparent evidence of mispricing based on the empirical coefficients 
from estimating (4) and (5), then a buy-and-hold strategy of going long in relatively 
underpriced stocks and short in relatively overpriced stocks should yield excess returns. 
                                                      
8
 Note that under the Ohlson (1999) framework, value irrelevance (e.g., which occurs for DS (RDS) when 
 
α1 + α2 = 0  
 
(α1 + α3 = 0) ) of an earnings component implies that it has no impact on goodwill, which is the 
difference between equity market value and book value.  Ohlson (1999, 152) further states: “an incremental 
dollar of transitory earnings adds a dollar to market value.” This claim is easy to validate as long as one keeps in 
mind that a dollar of transitory earnings also adds a dollar to book value.”  
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Any mismatch between the forecasting and valuation results for DS or RDS need not 
necessarily be attributable to its mispricing by investors. It might be the case, for example, 
that although RDSt  cannot be used to forecast VCNIt+1
a




 (k = 2,3,…) . If this were the case, RDS would not be valuation irrelevant, and the 
mismatch between forecasting and valuation coefficients would be attributable to variables 
omitted from both equations. The hedge returns tests provide a means of examining this 
issue. 
If transaction cost considerations imply that small firms are more difficult to price, 
then we would expect the hedge portfolio returns to be greater than in the case of larger firms.  
Therefore, we estimate and test predictions relating to (4) and (5) separately for small, 
medium, and large firms based on equity market value and conduct hedge return tests also 
separately for small, medium, and large firms. 
Hedge Portfolio Strategy and Procedure 
Hedge Strategy Overview 
 We determine the hedge portfolio strategy in the following manner. First, for each 
sample year, we rank firms according to either DS or RDS as a fraction of end-of-year equity 
book value, BVE.9 We then form ten portfolios whereby the first (tenth) portfolio contains 
those observations with the smallest (largest) fraction of DS or RDS. Second, within each of 
                                                      
9
 Untabulated findings based on DS and RDS deflated by total assets result in no changes in inferences. 
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the ten DS or RDS portfolios we rank firms according to equity market capitalization and 
assign each firm to one of three equal-sized groups of firms comprising the small, medium, 
and large firms. This procedure results in there being ten portfolios within each of the three 
firm size groups. It also ensures that the magnitude of DS or RDS does not vary 
systematically across the three firm size groups, and thereby helps to mitigate the 
confounding effect of firm size when conducting our hedge portfolio tests.10 Third, we then 
combine observations from all sample years, retaining the firm size designation and DS and 
RDS portfolio rankings. This results in there being three firm-size groups, within each of 
which there are ten DS or RDS portfolios.11 Fourth, within each of the three firm size groups, 
for each firm in the ten DS or RDS portfolios, we compute the risk-adjusted return over all 
sample years. Fifth, we compute the hedge return by deducting the equally-weighted mean 
risk-adjusted return on the portfolio(s) comprising firms we expect to be most overvalued 
from the return on portfolio(s) comprising firms we expect to be either undervalued or least 
                                                      
10
 By design, this procedure is a double-conditional sort of first RDS (or DS) then size. As a consequence, this 
procedure can fail to adequately control for size differences between long and short RDS portfolios. To assess 
the sensitivity of hedge returns, we reversed the sorting procedure and recomputed hedge returns sorting 
firm-years using a double-conditional sort of first size then RDS. Hedge return findings based on this alternative 
procedure result in inferences that are substantially the same as those based on the tabulated hedge return 
findings. 
11
 Because firm size is increasing during our sample period, some large firms in early sample years would be 
considered small firms in later sample years. However, because firm size groupings are determined annually, 




We predict that overvaluation is most likely to occur for firms whose income is 
overstated relative to very comprehensive net income, and where the market fails to 
understand the economic implications of such overstatement. As noted in Section II, we 
expect these conditions to be more descriptive for RDS than DS. Recall that RDS is generally 
non-positive because the accounting procedures that give rise to RDS arise from equity 
transactions that generally are recorded at less than market value. Our hedge strategy is 
therefore long in firms with least negative RDS and short in firms with most negative RDS.  
We employ a similar strategy for DS, i.e., go long in firms with most positive DS and short in 
firms with most negative DS. As noted above, we do not expect this DS-based hedge strategy 
to yield significant positive (or negative) excess returns. 
Following Bernard and Thomas (1990), we compute the hedge return for each of the 
three firm size groups by going long (short) in the firms in the top three (bottom three) DS or 
RDS portfolios. Combining observations in the top three and bottom three DS or RDS 
portfolios confers the benefit of mitigating the potential effects of measurement error in the 
extreme DS or RDS portfolios. We employ the hedge portfolio tests to complement the tests 
based on the forecasting and valuation equations. In particular, if the forecasting and 
                                                      
12
 Untabulated findings based on hedge returns computed with value-weighted portfolio risk-adjusted returns 
result in no change in inferences. Additional untabulated findings based on cumulative abnormal returns also 
result in no change in inferences. 
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valuation equations yield evidence of mispricing, notably undervaluation of DS or RDS, then 
the hedge portfolio tests should yield evidence that excess returns can be earned by exploiting 
such undervaluation. Conversely, if the forecasting and valuation equations yield no evidence 
of mispricing, then the hedge portfolio tests should yield evidence that excess returns cannot 
be earned following our hedge strategy.  
Hedge Strategy Implementation Details 
 To estimate risk-adjusted return, we need a measure of expected stock return.  
Following Ang and Liu (2004), Ibbotson Associates (2005), Massa et al. (2005), and Barth et 
al. (2008), we use the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model, supplemented with the 
momentum factor (Jegadeesh and Titman 1993; Carhart 1997), with time-varying factor 
loadings, risk-free rates, and risk premia. We calculate each firm’s expected equity return for 
month t + 1
 
as of month t, 
, 1i tER + , conditional on the expected factor returns in month 
t + 1, based on (6): 
ERi,t+1 = Rf ,t+1 + βRMRF,i,t+1(RM ,t+1 − Rf ,t+1)+ βSMB,i,t+1SMBt+1
  +βHML,i,t+1HMLt+1 + βMOM ,i,t+1MOMt+1,      (6) 
where βRMRF ,i,t +1,  βSMB,i,t +1 , βHML,i,t +1 , and βMOM ,i,t +1  are firm-specific coefficients estimated 
from (7) below. RM ,t +1 − Rf ,t +1 , SMBt +1 , HMLt +1 , and MOM t +1  are the expected monthly 
Fama-French and momentum factor returns for month t + 1. We estimate the expected 
monthly factor returns for month t
 
by first calculating each factor’s average monthly return 
over the 60 months prior to month t . The difference, ,
,, tftM RR −  is the monthly return of 
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the market portfolio in excess of the risk-free rate, HMLt  and SMBt  are the monthly returns 
to the book-to-market and size factor-mimicking portfolios, respectively, as described in 
Fama and French (1993), and MOMt  is the monthly return to the momentum 
factor-mimicking portfolio. The risk-adjusted return for firm i
 
in month t + 1 is the 
difference between the firm’s realized return in month t + 1, Ri,t +1, and its expected return,
 
, 1i tER + . We then use these monthly risk-adjusted returns to compute annual returns. In the 
hedge return tests, we cumulate return three months after fiscal year end to ensure that the 
financial statements are available to the public. 
For each firm, we estimate the betas associated with the firm’s return to each of the 
Fama-French and momentum factors by estimating the following monthly time-series 
regression: 
Ri,t − Rf ,t = αi + βRMRF,i(RM ,t − Rf ,t ) + βSMB,iSMBt + βHML,iHMLt + βMOM ,iMOMt + εi,t ,  (7) 
where Ri,t − Rf ,t  is the firm’s monthly return in excess of the risk-free rate.  We  
estimate (7) using the most recent 60 month returns prior to the month t. This results in 
estimated coefficients, ˆβRMTF,i,t ,  β , ,ˆ ,SMB i t  β , ,ˆ ,HML i t  and β , ,ˆ ,MOM i t  which are updated 
monthly. We define our forecast of each factor beta for month t +1  using the fitted value for 
that factor for month t, e.g., β β+ =, , 1 , ,ˆ .RMTF i t RMTF i t  
 Following Doyle et al. (2003), we compute hedge returns over one-, two-, and three-year 
horizons. We conjecture that if hedge returns continue to increase over longer horizons, then 
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such evidence would be indicative of unmodeled risk differences. Therefore, we expect hedge 
returns to flatten over the three year horizon. To avoid imposing the assumption of normality 
of the distribution of excess returns, we report an additional test for significance of the hedge 
returns using a t-test based on a boot-strapping procedure. Specifically, we select firm 
observations that we randomly assign to the ten portfolios. We then calculate the hedge return. 
We repeat this procedure 1,000 times, thereby generating an empirical distribution that we 
use to report empirical p-values in addition to conventional t-statistics and their implied 
p-values. 
IV. SAMPLE AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
We obtain most of the data for estimation of (4) and (5) for 1976-2006 from the 
Compustat Primary, Secondary, and Tertiary, Full Coverage, and Research Annual Industrial 
Files. DSt  and RDSt  are calculated using Compustat and CRSP data as described in 
section 3.1. We compute VCNI ta  as VCNIt – rBVEt-1, where VCNIt  includes both DSt and 
RDSt. Following Barth et al. (1999, 2005), Dechow et al. (1999), Bell et al. (2002), and 
Landsman et al. (2007), we set r, the cost-of-equity capital, equal to 12 percent, and we 
require sample firms to have positive equity book value.13 We also require that sample firms 
have total assets in excess of $10 million to avoid the undue influence of small firms. To 
                                                      
13
 None of our inferences are affected by assuming alternative values for r, including firm-specific values based 
on our multi-factor model. 
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mitigate the effects of outliers, for each variable within each of the three size categories, we 
treat as missing observations that are in the extreme top and bottom one percentile. For each 
sample year, firms are ranked according to end-of-year market value of common equity and 
assigned into one of three equal sized groups of firms comprising the small, medium, and 
large firms.  We estimate (4) and (5) using unscaled data (Barth and Kallapur 1996). We 
assess significance of regression coefficients using two-way clustered standard errors, with 
firm and year clusters (Petersen 2009).14 The final sample for estimation of (4) and (5) 
comprises 37,097 firm-year observations. 
We obtain stock return, R, from CRSP and R f , the one-month Treasury rate, and the 
Fama-French and momentum factor returns from the Fama-French database 
(http://www.mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library). To obtain excess 
returns per (6), we estimate factor loadings from (7) using monthly return data beginning in 
1972.15 There are 30,383 potential DS firm-year excess return observations. However, 
because there are 17,579 observations with zero DS, we limit our DS hedge return analysis to 
the 12,804 non-zero observations. There are 28,346 RDS firm-year excess return 
                                                      
14
 We also compute significance levels using bootstrapping. Untabulated findings result in no changes in 
inferences from those based on reported findings for RDS. For DS, the forecasting and valuation coefficients are 
still consistent, but with both significantly positive forecasting and valuation coefficients for small and medium 
firms. 
15
 Although excess returns can be computed through 2006, our sample stops in 2003. This is because we 
compute hedge returns for one, two, and three-year horizons, and to facilitate comparison over returns time, we 




Table 1, Panel A presents distributional statistics and Panel B presents Pearson and 
Spearman correlations. Panel A reveals that, on average, the market value of equity exceeds 
the book value of equity for all size firms and mean abnormal earnings, VCNI a , is positive 
for large firms but negative for medium and small firms. Table 1, Panel B reveals that the 
explanatory variables in (4) and (5) are correlated with each other, but not so much as to raise 
collinearity concerns. Although the distributional statistics reported in Panel A reveal the 
variables are skewed, none of the key inferences are affected when the equations are 
estimated on a per share basis.  




 and Nt > N t−1, we expect RDS to be negative. Table 1, 
Panel A reveals that RDS turns positive before the 75th percentile. Untabulated statistics 
reveal that RDS turns positive between the 60th and 70th percentiles for two-thirds of the 
sample years, and beyond the 70th percentile for the remaining third. Because it is unlikely 
that equity transactions will give rise to positive RDS, this means that at least some of our 
observations are measured with error. Assuming this error is unsystematic, the implication of 
this is a reduction in power of our tests, particularly those relating to the hedge returns. 
Untabulated statistics reveal that mean RDS is economically largest (i.e., most 
negative) for Pharmaceuticals, Services, Food, and Computers, and that mean RDS is 
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economically largest in 1997, 1998, and 2002. To mitigate the impact of particular industries 
or years overly influencing our results, below we report supplementary findings from hedge 
return tests that exclude those industries and years with the largest mean RDS values. 
V. RESULTS 
Forecasting Equations 
Table 2, Panel A presents regression summary statistics from estimating equation (4). 
We employ separate estimations for small, medium, and large firms and the pooled sample.  
Panel A reveals in all cases, the forecasting coefficient for abnormal very comprehensive 
income, 1ω , is significantly positive. It is also increasing in firm size, which is consistent 
with greater persistence for larger firms. 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
The incremental forecasting coefficient for DS, 2ω , is significantly different from 
zero for only the large firms. More importantly, the total DS forecasting coefficient, 21 ωω + , 
is insignificantly different from zero for all three groups of firms and for the pooled sample 
(t-statistics = 0.46, 0.98, 0.59, and 0.59).16 These findings indicate that DS is forecasting 
irrelevant for VCNI a  for all firms. If investors correctly understand the implications of these 
persistence findings for valuation, then we should observe valuation irrelevance of DS for all 
firms, i.e., DS should have a zero total valuation coefficient in the valuation equation. 
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The incremental forecasting coefficient for RDS, 3ω , is significantly negative in all 
cases. The total RDS forecasting coefficient,ω1 +ω3 , is insignificantly different from zero for 
all size firms and the pooled sample (t-statistics = 1.29, 0.84, −0.85, and −0.81). These 
findings indicate that RDS is forecasting irrelevant for VCNI a  for all firms. As with DS, if 
investors correctly understand the implications of these persistence findings for valuation, 
then we should observe valuation irrelevance of RDS for all firms. 
Valuation Equations 
Table 2, Panel B reveals the valuation coefficient for VCNI a , α1 , is significantly 
positive in all cases. It is also increasing in firm size, ranging from 1.05 for small firms to 
7.83 for large firms, which is consistent with the pattern of increasing persistence displayed 
in Table 2, Panel A. 
The incremental valuation coefficient for DS, α2 , is insignificantly different from 
zero for small and medium firms and significantly negative for large firms. More importantly, 
its total coefficient, α1 + α2 , is also insignificantly different from zero for all three groups as 
well as the pooled sample (t-statistics = 1.03, 1.10, -0.39, and -0.43). This finding is expected 
based on the findings about the lack of persistence for DS revealed in Table 2, Panel A. 
The incremental valuation coefficient for RDS, α 3 , is significantly negative in all 
cases. Its total coefficient, α1 + α 3 , is also significantly negative for all groups (t-statistics = 
−5.45, −8.37, −4.76, and −4.93). Based on the forecasting coefficient findings in Table 2, 
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Panel A, we expect to observe α1 + α 3  to be insignificantly different from zero for all size 
firms. However, finding that α1 + α 3 < 0  implies that an incremental dollar of RDS 
increases market value by less than a dollar.17 Thus investors appear to undervalue the RDS 
component of income, i.e., over-value equity.18 
Dirty Surplus Hedge Returns 
Table 3 reports buy-and-hold Fama-French risk-adjusted stock returns for firms in the 
top and bottom three deciles of firms classified according to the (signed) magnitude of DS as 
a fraction of equity book value at the beginning of the cumulation period. Results are 
presented separately for small, medium, and large firms, and for the pooled sample. The table 
presents mean returns for one-, two- and three-year horizons and the median values of 
DS/BVE for each group, as well as hedge returns and associated t-statistics and empirical 
p-values. 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
                                                      
17
 Note that the market’s treatment of RDS as having negative persistence can be restated as implying that the 
market views the benefits to the firm from a transaction that give rise to RDS as exceeding its RDS costs. For 
this to occur, the market would have to believe that benefits would flow to the firm in future periods at a level 
beyond that which could be inferred from the time series properties of residual income. In other words, RDS 
would play two roles—being both a current period cost and a proxy for an Ohlson-type other information 
variable. An example of this is the market believing an intangible asset arising from employee stock options is 
greater than the dilution cost to current shareholders. 
18
 The findings in Table 2 could be attributable to variables predictive of future earnings and returns that are 
correlated with RDS. Fairfield et al. (2003) identify two such accounting-based variables, short-term accruals 
and growth in net operating assets. Untabulated findings reveal that inclusion of these variables in (4) and (5) 
does not affect any inferences we draw from Table 2. 
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The findings indicate that for medium and large firms, and for the pooled sample, 
mean risk-adjusted returns and associated hedge returns for all three horizons are essentially 
zero. However, for small firms, the mean risk-adjusted returns are positive and monotonically 
increasing over the three-year horizon, suggesting that Fama-French risk adjustments may not 
perfectly eliminate the pricing effects of risk. Nonetheless, the small firm hedge returns are 
zero, indicating that the mismeasurement of expected return for small firms is unrelated to 
assignment of observations to DS portfolios. The small firm hedge returns being zero is 
consistent with investors pricing DS correctly. 
Taken together, the findings in Tables 2 and 3 suggest little evidence of mispricing of 
stocks based on the magnitude of DS. Alternatively, the findings suggest investors make no 
adjustments to reflect DS items, but this has no pricing implications, because when earnings 
items are transitory they should only be impounded into price as a result of being included in 
the book value of equity. 
Really Dirty Surplus Hedge Returns 
Table 4 reports buy-and-hold Fama-French risk-adjusted stock returns for firms in the 
top and bottom three deciles of firms classified according to the (signed) magnitude of RDS 
as a fraction of equity book value at the beginning of the cumulation period. Table 4 presents 
analogous statistics to those presented in Table 3, but are based on RDS rather than DS. 
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Results are presented separately for small, medium, and large firms, and for the pooled 
sample. 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
In contrast to Table 3, the findings in Table 4 generally indicate that risk-adjusted 
returns differ from zero for all firm groups across all three horizons. In addition, the returns 
move increasingly away from zero in absolute terms over the investing horizon for almost 
every portfolio. This is particularly pronounced for small firms, for which the one-, two-, and 
three-year risk-adjusted returns for the top 30 percent (bottom 30 percent) portfolios are 0.08, 
0.12, and 0.17 (0.03, 0.06, 0.08). Recall that the excess returns for small firms in Table 3 also 
are positive and almost identical for firms in the bottom and top 30 percent portfolios, which 
we attribute to the difficulty of measuring expected return for small firms. We can therefore 
treat the excess returns for small firms reported in Table 3 as a benchmark for the 
measurement error in expected return. Using this approach, we can deduct the average of the 
two portfolio returns for each investing horizon to arrive at a better estimate of risk-adjusted 
returns for the small firms. This results in one-, two-, and three-year risk-adjusted returns for 
the top 30 percent (bottom 30 percent) portfolios of 0.01, 0.02, and 0.02 (−0.06, −0.04, 
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−0.07). Note that these additional risk adjustments for the small firms have no effect on their 
hedge returns because the same adjustment is made to both the long and short positions.19 
Turning to the hedge returns, Table 4 reveals that they are significantly positive in all 
three firm size groups and for the pooled sample. Table 4 also reveals that the hedge returns 
are increasing over time. For example, for small firms, the one-, two-, and three-year hedge 
returns are 0.06, 0.07, and 0.09. It is possible that the increasing hedge returns over time 
could be attributable to an unmodeled risk factor.20’21 
Additional RDS Hedge Return Tests 
In this section, we consider several additional tests to examine the sensitivity of the 
RDS hedge returns to previously documented pricing anomalies and risk factors, and to 
alternative procedures for computing those returns. We also attempt to determine the extent 
to which different source components of RDS account for our hedge return results. 
                                                      
19
 A similar adjustment to excess returns for medium and large firms could be made. However, Table 3 
indicates that excess returns for medium and large firms are bounded between −0.01 and 0.02, which suggests 
that measurement error in expected returns is relatively immaterial for these groups of firms. 
20
 One possible candidate is firm size, as Table 4 indicates that firms in bottom 30% RDS portfolios are roughly 
twice as large as those in the top 30%. To assess the importance of firm size on hedge returns, we regressed 
excess return on firm size and an indicator variable for whether a firm-year observation is in the top 30% RDS 
portfolio. Untabulated findings indicate that the indicator variable coefficient is significantly positive in all cases 
and over all horizons, and the coefficient on size is insignificant in all specifications. 
21
 In addition, it is possible that significant hedge returns are induced by our implementation of risk-adjusting 
returns. Untabulated hedge returns computed without explicit adjustment for risk yield inferences consistent 
with those based on the tabulated findings. 
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First, we investigate whether the persistence of the RDS hedge returns could reflect 
the effects of pricing anomalies documented in prior research. We consider each anomaly, in 
turn, by first placing observations into one of ten portfolios based on the magnitude of each 
anomaly factor. Then, within each portfolio, we rank observations according to the 
magnitude of RDS as a fraction of BVE, assigning each observation within each anomaly 
portfolio to one of ten RDS portfolios. This double-sorting process helps to ensure that our 
findings are not the result of the particular anomaly used in the initial sort.   
The pricing anomalies we consider are: the short-term accruals anomaly (Sloan 1996; 
Xie 2001); the growth in long-term asset accrual anomaly (Fairfield et al. 2003); the 
long-term pricing reversal anomaly (Daniel and Titman 2006; Fama and French 2008a), and 
the share repurchase and issuance anomaly (Ikenberry et al. 1995;Daniel and Titman 2006; 
Mitchell and Stafford 2000; Fama and French 2008a). The share repurchase and issuance 
anomaly is potentially most closely related to the RDS pricing anomaly we document because 
the latter can only arise from equity transactions. Untabulated findings reveal that RDS hedge 
returns remain significantly positive after controlling for the potential confounding effects of 
each of the four anomalies. Thus, mispricing associated with previously documented 
anomalies appears not to account for our finding investor mispricing of RDS. 
Second, we consider an alternative to our buy-and-hold procedure for computing RDS 
hedge returns. Following Marshruwala et al. (2006), we estimate hedge returns using a 
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monthly calendar-time portfolio approach (Fama and French 1993). Under this approach, 
hedge returns are calculated based on Jensen’s alphas from monthly time-series regressions 
of hedge portfolio excess returns on Fama-French and momentum factor returns. For each 
sample year, we assign firms into decile portfolios based on RDS as a fraction of equity book 
value and compute the mean monthly portfolio return for firms in the top and bottom three 
deciles. We then estimate the following monthly time-series regression for both the high and 
low RDS portfolios: 
Rp,t − R f ,t =α p + βp (RM ,t − R f ,t )+ spSMBt + hpHMLt + mpMOM t +ε p,t  . (8) 
The resulting Jensen’s alpha, αp , measures the mean monthly return for portfolio p not 
attributable to the Fama-French and momentum factor returns. We predict that αp  for the 
high RDS portfolio is larger than that for the low RDS portfolio. We formally test this by 
estimating (8) for a hedge portfolio, which is constructed as the difference in mean monthly 
excess returns for the high RDS and low RDS portfolios,22 and then testing whether the 
resulting Jensen’s alpha is significantly positive. 
Consistent with our predictions, untabulated findings indicate that Jensen’s alpha for 
the high RDS portfolio is larger than that for low portfolio for all three firm size groups: 
0.005 vs. 0.003 (small firms); 0.001 vs. 0.000 (medium firms); 0.001 vs. 0.000 (large firms). 
For the pooled sample, the high and low portfolio Jensen’s alpha are 0.002 and 0.000, 
                                                      
22
 The independent variables (risk factors) are the same for each portfolio and are therefore included in the 
hedge portfolio without adjustment. 
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respectively. The Jensen’s alpha of the hedge portfolio is statistically significant for only the 
small firms and the pooled sample, 0.003 (t-statistic = 2.25; p-value = 0.03) and 0.002 
(t-statistic = 2.27; p-value = 0.02), which in annual terms indicate excess returns to the 
RDS-based hedging strategy of 3.7 percent and 2.4 percent respectively. These findings 
contrast with those from the buy-and-hold hedge returns in Table 4, which indicate hedge 
returns are positive for all three firm size groups. Ascertaining which approach yields the 
more reliable results is not straightforward. For example, the buy-and-hold approach has the 
advantage of updating the individual stock’s expected return on a monthly basis using 
out-of-sample estimation, and the alpha approach assumes that factor betas are constant 
during the test period.23  
Third, we attempt to determine the extent to which different source components of 
RDS account for our hedge return results. Findings from the forecasting and valuation tests 
are consistent with, in the aggregate, RDS components of very comprehensive net income 
being transitory, but investors failing to understand this and over-valuing equity. Ideally, we 
would like to identify separate components of RDS, determine their persistence, and then 
ascertain which components investors appear to fail to price correctly. Because we face the 
same data limitations as investors, we can only do this indirectly by sequentially excluding 
and including firm-years in which RDS is more likely to be attributable to one particular type 
                                                      
23
 For a discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of the various approaches, see Fama and French (2008b).   
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of transaction. First, to focus on the potential pricing effects of pooling-of-interests 
transactions, we recomputed hedge returns (a) excluding firm-years with corporate mergers 
or acquisitions, and (b) using only firm years with corporate mergers.24 Second, to focus on 
the potential pricing effects of employee stock options, we recomputed hedge returns using (a) 
only observations beginning in 1995, and (b) only observations before 1995. Because SFAS 
123 required disclosure of weighted average exercise price for employee stock options after 
1995, hedge returns might be expected to fall or even disappear in this latter period. Third, to 
focus more generally on the pricing effects of dilutive transactions, including warrants, 
convertible instruments, as well as stock options, we recomputed hedge returns for portfolios 
sorting firm-year observations on the difference between basic and diluted earnings per share 
as a fraction of equity book value. Finally, because RDS is concentrated in particular 
industries and years, as noted in Section IV, we sequentially calculated hedge returns 
excluding the six industries and the five years with the most negative RDS.  
Untabulated findings from each of these additional analyses reveal that hedge returns 
remain significant in all cases. These findings are consistent with our tests lacking power to 
trace the precise sources of RDS. They are also consistent with RDS being correlated with an 
unmodeled risk factor. 
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 Ideally, we would compute hedge returns for subsamples excluding and including only those firm-years with 
mergers accounted for under pooling-of-interests. However, because such identifying information is only 
available to us using the Securities Data Corporation beginning in the middle of our sample period, we elected 




The question we address in this study is whether firms’ share prices correctly reflect 
two accounting measures, dirty surplus and really dirty surplus. We find that both dirty 
surplus and really dirty surplus are forecasting irrelevant for abnormal very comprehensive 
income for all firm size groups. Taking these results at face value (i.e., assuming that the 
forecasting and valuation equations correctly capture the time series properties of these 
variables), if investors correctly understand the implications of these persistence findings for 
valuation, then each kind of dirty surplus should be valuation irrelevant for all firms. This 
prediction is borne out in the case of dirty surplus. In contrast, the findings indicate that 
investors appear to undervalue really dirty surplus, which is consistent with the premise that 
investors are unable to assess the economic implications of really dirty surplus transactions. 
However, the possibility remains that the mismatch of the really dirty surplus forecasting and 
valuation coefficients is the result of model misspecification rather than mispricing. 
Our buy-and-hold hedge return results support the findings from the tests linking the 
forecasting and valuation equations. Hedge returns are insignificantly different from zero 
when based upon dirty surplus, regardless of firm size and investing horizon. In contrast, 
buy-and-hold hedge returns based on really dirty surplus are significantly positive for three 
firm size groups as well as for the pooled sample. Findings from additional tests reveal that 
inferences relating to hedge returns are insensitive to an alternative procedure to measuring 
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hedge returns, to including controls for four previously identified mispricing anomalies, and 
to sampling procedures designed to focus on sources of really dirty surplus. 
Taken together, the findings are consistent with investors failing to understand the 
lack of persistence of really dirty surplus, and therefore apparently overvaluing firms that 
have large negative really dirty surplus. However, because we are unable to trace the sources 
of really dirty surplus to particular types of equity transactions, we cannot determine the 
extent to which potential mispricing arises from each type of transaction. However, even if 
we could trace the sources of really dirty surplus, any resulting hedge returns might still be 
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TABLE 1  Descriptive Statistics for Equity Market Value, Equity Book Value, Abnormal 
Earnings, Dirty Surplus, Really Dirty Surplus for a Sample of 37,097 Firm-Year Observations, 
1976-2006 
         
Panel A: Distributional statistics (in $ million)    
  
       
Variablea  Mean 25th % Median 75th % Std. Dev.   
MVE  2,216.57 89.98 388.66 1,537.13 6,282.58   
BVE  894.42 65.67 213.53 745.84 2,151.25   
VCNI  102.05 2.01 15.50 73.56 377.09   
VCNIa  4.43 -13.30 -0.27 12.96 262.01   
DS  0.68 0.00 0.00 0.00 49.43   
RDS  -18.90 -6.27 -0.42 0.02 150.51   
         
Panel A.1 : Distributional statistics for small Firms (in $ million)b   
  
       
Variablea  Mean 25th % Median 75th % Std. Dev.   
MVE  85.88 24.22 50.64 99.54 102.40   
BVE  64.65 20.96 40.99 81.83 66.82   
VCNI  2.37 -0.18 2.46 6.51 11.83   
VCNIa  -5.06 -6.79 -1.48 0.78 13.17   
DS  0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.23   
RDS  -0.73 -0.52 -0.03 0.01 3.76   
         
Panel A.2: Distributional statistics for medium Firms (in $ million)b    
  
       
Variablea  Mean 25th % Median 75th % Std. Dev.   
MVE  531.34 189.03 369.80 700.67 487.35   
BVE  283.47 112.81 200.98 366.31 249.43   
VCNI  22.95 7.71 18.52 37.65 43.79   
VCNIa  -7.95 -14.94 0.44 9.11 44.01   
DS  0.27 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.62   
RDS  -4.61 -4.94 -0.67 0.02 18.51   
         





(Table 1: continued from last page) 
 
Panel A.3 : Distributional statistics for large Firms (in $ million)b   
  
       
Variablea  Mean 25th % Median 75th % Std. Dev.   
MVE  5,914.80 1,240.97 2,685.64 6,020.24 9,741.45   
BVE  2,290.81 602.20 1,167.00 2,477.00 3,248.53   
VCNI  275.33 46.54 123.25 318.75 608.33   
VCNIa  25.62 -52.27 18.65 97.62 446.07   
DS  1.70 -2.05 0.00 1.34 84.46   
RDS  -50.37 -36.63 -5.32 0.15 254.37   
         
         
         
Panel B:  Correlations, with Pearson (Spearman) correlations above (below) the diagonal 
  
       
Variablea  MVE BVE VCNI VCNIa DS RDS  
MVE  1.000 0.802 0.733 0.343 0.044 -0.251  
BVE  0.942 1.000 0.761 0.206 0.059 -0.202  
VCNI  0.675 0.672 1.000 0.784 0.108 0.167  
VCNIa  0.186 0.105 0.628 1.000 0.118 0.431  
DS  0.005 0.007 0.062 0.106 1.000 -0.149  
RDS  -0.340 -0.287 -0.057 0.125 -0.055 1.000  
         





a Variable definitions ( in $ million)  
MVE = market value of common shares outstanding as of fiscal year-end (Compustat #24 * #25). 
BVE = book value of common equity as of fiscal year-end (Compustat #60 + #227 - #242). 
VCNI = very comprehensive earnings (Compustat #172 – #19 + DS + RDS). 
VCNIa = abnormal comprehensive earnings, defined as very comprehensive earnings (VCNI) minus  
0.12 * BVE (lagged one year). 
DS = dirty surplus, measured as the sum of (1) change in the balance of unrealized gains or losses on 
marketable securities (change in Compustat # 238), (2) change in the cumulative foreign 
exchange adjustment (change in Compustat # 230), and (3) 0.65 times change in additional 
pension liability in excess of unrecognized prior service costs (change in Min (Compustat #297 
- # 298, 0)). 
RDS = really dirty surplus, measured as the change in the book value of common equity (Compustat 
#60 + #227 - #242), less DS, less net income (Compustat #172 – #19), plus dividends 
(Compustat #21), less share price at middle of fiscal year times change in common shares 
outstanding (Compustat # 25, adjusted for stock dividends and splits). 
b
 Firms are ranked for each sample year according to firm size, i.e., equity market value, and assigned into one of 




Table 2 Regressions of Abnormal Earnings and Equity Market Value, with Dirty Surplus and Really Dirty Surplus Included as Separate 
Regressors, for a Sample of 37,097 Firm-Year Observations, 1976-2006a 
          
 
            
Panel A: Summary statistics from regression of abnormal earnings on lagged abnormal earnings, dirty surplus, really dirty surplus, and 




= ω0 + ω1VCNIit
a + ω2DSit + ω3RDSit + ω4BVEit + ε it +1   
                       
                   Forecasting Relevance test  
    Intercept  VCNIa  DS  RDS  BVE  ω1+ω2=0 ω1+ω3=0 
Sample No. of Obs.  Coef.  t-stat.  Coef.  t-stat.  Coef.  t-stat.  Coef.  t-stat.  Coef.  t-stat.   t-stat.   t-stat.  
Smallb  12,257  0.74 2.88 * 0.39 15.91 * -0.28 -1.13  -0.35 -13.15 * -0.07 -10.25 * 0.46  1.29  
Mediumb 12,213  4.59 3.99 * 0.47 17.85 * -0.15 -0.43  -0.45 -11.73 * -0.04 -5.64 * 0.98  0.84  
Largeb  12,627  -16.23 -2.64 * 0.53 9.94 * -0.43 -2.35 * -0.59 -6.65 * 0.00 0.78  0.59  -0.85  
Pooled  37,097  -7.98 -4.10 * 0.53 10.07 * -0.43 -2.35 * -0.58 -6.65 * 0.00 0.54  0.59  -0.81  
                       
                       






(Table 2: continued from last page) 
 
Panel B: Summary statistics from regression of market value of equity on abnormal earnings, dirty surplus, really dirty surplus, and 




MVEit = α0 + α1VCNIit
a + α2DSit + α3RDSit + α4BVEit + uit+1  
 
              Valuation Relevance test 
    Intercept  VCNIa  DS  RDS  BVE  α1+α2=0 α1+α3=0 
Sample No. of Obs.  Coef.  t-stat.  Coef.  t-stat.  Coef.  t-stat.  Coef.  t-stat.  Coef.  t-stat.   t-stat.   t-stat.  
Smallb  12,257  8.85 2.17 * 1.05 8.66 * 1.21 0.55  -3.56 -6.81 * 1.23 12.47 * 1.03  -5.45 * 
Mediumb 12,213  101.80 3.39 * 2.72 8.13 * -0.21 -0.09  -5.09 -9.53 * 1.51 13.56 * 1.10  -8.37 * 
Largeb  12,627  766.66 4.11 * 7.83 10.37 * -9.30 -2.33 * -10.88 -9.50 * 1.93 15.87 * -0.39  -4.76 * 
Pooled  37,097  187.08 3.27 * 7.76 10.39 * -9.37 -2.34 * -10.96 -9.60 * 2.01 16.94 * -0.43  -4.93 * 
                       
a See Table 1 for definitions of all variables. 
               
b
 Firms are ranked for each sample year according to firm size, i.e., equity market value, and assigned into one of three equal-sized groups of firms comprising the small, 
medium, and large firms. 
* (^) indicates coefficient is significantly different from zero at less than the 0.05 (0.10) level.
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Table 3 Mean Fama-French Risk-adjusted Stock Returns in Top and Bottom Three Deciles of  
Non-zero Dirty Surplus Deflated by Book Value of Owner Equity for a Sample of 12,804 Firm-Year 
Observations, 1976-2003a,b  
Small Firmsc 
    
 
  
Portfolioc no. of obs. MVE DS/BVE 1 year  2 Year 3 Year 
Bottom 30% 1,314  162.30 -0.022 0.08  0.11 0.16 
Top 30% 1,303  146.09 0.016 0.07  0.10 0.15 
Hedge Returnd 
   -0.01  0.00 0.00 
t-stat.    -0.51  -0.13 -0.07 
Empirical p-valuee    0.72  0.56 0.54 
        
Medium Firmsc 
    
 
  
Portfolioc no. of obs. MVE DS/BVE 1 year  2 Year 3 Year 
Bottom 30% 1,279  1,075.51 -0.021 -0.01  0.00 0.01 
Top 30% 1,272  934.83 0.016 0.02  0.01 0.00 
Hedge Returnd 
   0.03  0.00 -0.02 
t-stat.    1.71 ^ 0.20 -0.62 
Empirical p-valuee    0.03  0.39 0.73 
        
Large Firmsc 
    
 
  
Portfolioc no. of obs. MVE DS/BVE 1 year  2 Year 3 Year 
Bottom 30% 1,260  14,073.49 -0.023 0.00  0.00 0.00 
Top 30% 1,254  12,525.09 0.016 0.01  -0.01 -0.01 
Hedge Returnd 
   0.00  -0.01 -0.01 
t-stat.    0.34  -0.46 -0.55 
Empirical p-valuee    0.36  0.71 0.73 
        
Pooled Sample        
Portfolioc no. of obs. MVE DS/BVE 1 year  2 Year 3 Year 
Bottom 30% 3,853  5,014.65 -0.022 0.03  0.04 0.06 
Top 30% 3,829  4,462.24 0.016 0.03  0.03 0.05 
Hedge Returnd 
   0.01  -0.00 -0.01 
t-stat.    0.55  -0.19 -0.49 
Empirical p-valuee    0.33  0.58 0.67 









(Table 3: continued from last page)      
        
a See Table 1 for definitions of all variables 
b
 Fama-French risk-adjusted return is a firm’s actual return in excess of the risk-free rate less the 
firm’s predicted return based on the Fama-French factor and momentum factor mimicking portfolios, 
i.e., excess market return, size, book-to-market, and momentum factor. 
c
 Firm’s size designation and DS portfolio ranking are assigned in the following procedure: for each 
sample year, firms are ranked according to DS as a fraction of end of year equity book value, BVE 
and assigned into ten equal sized portfolios whereby the first (tenth) portfolio contains those 
observations with the smallest (largest) fraction of DS; within each of the ten DS portfolios, firms are 
ranked according to firm size, i.e., equity market value, and are assigned into to one of three equal 
sized groups of firms comprising the small, medium, and large firms. 
d
 The hedge return is computed by deducting the mean risk adjusted return on the bottom three deciles 
portfolio from that on the top three deciles portfolio. The strategy implementation begins three 
months subsequent to the firm’s fiscal year end. 
e
 The proportion of the hedge returns from 1,000 simulations exceeds the observed DS-based hedge 
return.  In a simulation, each firm is assigned a random number as the substitute for DS, and 
accordingly the portfolio ranking and size designation following the procedure in footnote c. 





Table 4 Mean Fama-French Risk-adjusted Stock Returns in Top and Bottom Three Deciles 
of Really Dirty Surplus Deflated by Book Value of Owner Equity for a Sample of 28,346 
Firm-Year Observations, 1976-2003a,b 
 
 
Small Firms Portfolioc 






 no. of obs. MVE RDS/BVE 1 year  2 Year  3 Year  
Bottom 30% 2,870 114.23 -0.046 0.03  0.06  0.08  
Top 30% 2,860 54.91 0.004 0.08  0.12  0.17  
Hedge Returnd 
   0.06  0.07  0.09  
t-stat.    3.61 * 2.61 * 2.81 * 
Empirical p-valuee 
  < 0.01  0.01  < 0.01  
 






Medium Firms Portfolioc         
 no. of obs. MVE RDS/BVE 1 year  2 Year  3 Year  
Bottom 30% 2,834 670.28 -0.046 -0.02  -0.05  -0.07  
Top 30% 2,824 351.69 0.004 0.01  0.01  0.00  
Hedge Returnd 
   0.03  0.06  0.07  
t-stat.    2.71 * 3.92 * 3.94 *
Empirical p-valuee 
  < 0.01  < 0.01  < 0.01  
 






Large Firms Portfolioc 

















Top 30% 2,805 5,625.89 0.004 0.01  0.02  0.02  
Hedge Returnd 
   0.04  0.06  0.08  
t-stat.    4.25 * 5.39 * 5.83 *
Empirical p-valuee 
  < 0.01  < 0.01  < 0.01  
 






Pooled Sample Portfolioc         
 no. of obs. MVE RDS/BE 1 year  2 Year  3 Year  
Bottom 30% 8,516 3,615.20 -0.046 -0.01  -0.01  -0.02  
Top 30% 8,489 1,994.44 0.004 0.04  0.05  0.07  
Hedge Returnd 
   0.04  0.06  0.08  
t-stat.    5.84 * 5.81 * 6.00 *
Empirical p-valuee 
  < 0.01  < 0.01  < 0.01  
(Continued on next page)         
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(Table 4: continued from last page)        
          
a See Table 1 for definitions of all variables       
b
 Fama-French risk-adjusted return is a firm’s actual return in excess of the risk-free 
rate less the firm’s predicted return based on the Fama-French factor and 
momentum factor mimicking portfolios, i.e., excess market return, size, 





 Firm’s size designation and RDS portfolio ranking are assigned in the following 
procedure: for each sample year, firms are ranked according to RDS as a fraction of 
end of year equity book value, BVE, and assigned into ten equal sized portfolios 
whereby the first (tenth) portfolio contains those observations with the smallest 
(largest) fraction of RDS; within each of the ten RDS portfolios, firms are ranked 
according to firm size, i.e., equity market value, and are assigned into to one of 









 The hedge return is computed by deducting the mean risk adjusted return on the 
bottom three deciles portfolio from that on the top three deciles portfolio. The 





e The proportion of the hedge returns from 1,000 simulations exceeds the observed 
RDS-based hedge return.  In a simulation, each firm is assigned a random number 
as the substitute for RDS, and accordingly the portfolio ranking and size 




* (^) indicates hedge return is significantly different from zero at less than the 0.05 (0.10) 
level. 
